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Abstract
There is substantially more trade within national borders than across borders. An important
explanation for this fact is the weak enforcement of international contracts. We develop a model
in which agents build reputations to overcome this institutional failure. The model describes the
interplay between institutional quality, reputations and the dynamics of international trade. It
also rationalizes several empirical regularities. We ﬁnd that history matters for trade volumes,
but that its eﬀects vary with the institutional setting of the country. The same is true for
the eﬃcacy of trade liberalization programs. Moreover, while stricter enforcement of contracts
enhances trade in the short run, it makes it harder for individual traders to develop good
reputations. We show that this indirect negative eﬀect may produce an "institutional trap":
for suﬃciently low initial levels of contract enforcement, a small tightening in enforcement
reduces future trade ﬂows. We ﬁnd also that search frictions aggravate the problems created by
weak enforceability of contracts, even if they impose no direct cost on agents, but that trade
liberalization can mitigate these negative eﬀects.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F10, F23, D83, L14
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Staiger, Susan Zhu and seminar participants at various institutions for comments and suggestions.“While performance is the glue of buyer-seller relationships, the trust that is built as partners
gain experience with each other is the lubricant.” [Egan and Mody 1992, p. 326]
1 Introduction
Countries trade too little with each other relative to what they trade with themselves. An expla-
nation for this fact is the weakness of contract enforcement across international jurisdictions. As
Rodrik (2000, p. 179) argues, “Transaction costs arise from various sources, but perhaps the most
obvious is the problem of contract enforcement. When one of the parties reneges on a written
contract, local courts may be unwilling–and international courts unable–to enforce a contract
signed between residents of two diﬀerent countries. Thus, national sovereignty interferes with con-
tract enforcement, leaving international transactions hostage to an increased risk of opportunistic
behavior.” Since rational agents anticipate that possibility, they trade less internationally than they
do within national borders.
The primary motivation for our paper relies on Rodrik being right–i.e., the idea that contract
enforcement is an important determinant of international transactions. We argue, in addition, that
traders build reputations within their relationships to mitigate the diﬃculties created by asymmetric
information when international contracts are not properly enforced. In this context, we characterize
how, more precisely, enforcement of contracts matters for international trade.
We develop a two-country dynamic model, where potential exporters from one country form
partnerships with distributors in the other country without knowing the type of each distributor.
We show that weak enforcement of international contracts depresses international trade, but facil-
itates the formation of reputations; the latter moderates the negative impact of weak enforcement
on trade. Still, since the process of reputation building is time-consuming, the volume of interna-
tional trade remains low relative to the levels attained when contracts are properly enforced. In
this sense, reputation is an imperfect substitute for adequate contract enforcement. In the long
run, however, reputations can become a perfect substitute if distributors are suﬃciently patient.
That is, if a partnership between an exporter and a distributor goes on indeﬁnitely, the reputation
of the latter becomes eventually so high that it makes contract enforcement irrelevant within that
partnership.
Our analysis shows that tightening the enforcement of contracts in a country would have a
direct positive eﬀect on trade but also an indirect negative eﬀect, because it would slow down the
process of reputation building. The net eﬀect on trade ﬂows within existing partnerships would
then depend on both the horizon of the analysis and the initial level of contract enforcement. In the
short run, when reputations are given, trade would increase for sure. However, because an increase
1in institutional quality has also the perverse eﬀect of making exporters more pessimistic about
the honesty of their distributors, future trade ﬂows would fall if the initial level of enforcement
were too low. In general, we show that the eﬀect of stricter contract enforcement on trade ﬂows
is higher, the higher the initial level of enforcement, indicating that there may be "increasing
returns" to contract enforcement: the higher its current level, the greater the impact on trade ﬂows
of increasing it further.
Additional results follow when we incorporate search frictions into our basic setting. We as-
sume that when a producer searches for a distributor, he may meet with one who is incapable of
distributing his good, in which case the producer does not export in that period. A producer can,
however, search for as many periods as he wants at no cost. Despite this essentially costless search
process, we ﬁnd that search frictions aggravate the problem created by incomplete information
about distributors’ types, carrying it from the partnership level to the aggregate level. The reason
is that distributors who honor contracts become available for a match only if their previous matches
were with producers whose products they were unable to distribute. Myopic distributors, on the
other hand, become available for that reason and also because they may have defaulted on contracts
in a previous relationship. As a result, the average quality of the pool of distributors with whom
producers can meet deteriorates continuously. Eventually, the prior formed by potential exporters
regarding their possible matches becomes so pessimistic that they stop searching, even though they
know that some patient distributors are still available. Thus, with search frictions, the market does
not replicate the perfect information equilibrium even in the long run.
Trade liberalization can mitigate this problem. When tariﬀs are reduced, the value of forming
foreign partnerships increases and it pays to search further for distributors. Through this process,
trade liberalization aﬀects the extensive margin of trade, promoting entry in the export market.
We also show that the eﬀect of lower tariﬀs on the volume of trade within existing partnerships
depends on the levels of both the reputation within the partnership and the country’s level of
contract enforcement. We ﬁnd in particular that, under certain conditions, trade liberalization is
more eﬀective in promoting trade within new partnerships, suggesting that history matters for the
eﬃcacy of trade liberalization.
Numerous case studies provide anecdotal support for our hypotheses that contract enforcement
is important for international trade and that agents rely on trust when enforcement is lenient.
For example, Woodruﬀ (1998) documents the diﬃculties faced by exporters in Mexico’s footwear
industry seeking to enter foreign markets created by the high cost of taking legal actions abroad.
Egan and Mody (1992, p. 327), through a series of interviews with U.S. entrepreneurs in the
bicycle and footwear industries, ﬁnd that “buyers consider trust an essential adjunct to formal
legal agreements, and some even use trust as a substitute.”
2Recently, economists have begun to assess these issues more formally. Anderson and Marcouiller
(2002), as well as Ranjan and Lee (2003), ﬁnd strong evidence that contract enforcement is a key
determinant of international trade ﬂows. Izquierdo et al. (2003) ﬁnd, in turn, that ﬁrms’ reputations
in third countries are an important factor in explaining bilateral trade ﬂows. And McMillan and
Woodruﬀ (1999), analyzing Vietnam, show forcefully how relationships based on trust arise and
develop in environments where contract enforcement is virtually absent.1
The available evidence, therefore, appears to leave little doubt about the importance of contract
enforcement and of reputations in international trade. Yet there has been no formal theoretical
analysis within the trade literature that integrates these two elements.2 Anderson (2003) and An-
derson and Young (2003) recognize the obstacles created by ineﬀective enforcement of international
contracts, but study instead countries’ choices of enforcement levels. McLaren (1999) characterizes,
in a static model, the circumstances under which ﬁrms choose to base their relationships on trust
instead of on (enforceable) contracts. We abstract from the issues McLaren focuses on–industry
structure and relationship-speciﬁc investments–to concentrate on the dynamics of trust within
partnerships when perfectly enforceable contracts are unavailable. Chisik (2003) examines instead
how the perception about producers from (otherwise identical) countries can become self-fulﬁlling
and aﬀect their choices of qualities, thus creating “reputational comparative advantages.” Greif
(1993), in turn, analyzes how limited contract enforceability and a precarious communications sys-
tem induced medieval merchants to build coalitions based upon reputation to sustain trade. He
considers, however, a complete information economy, and his main goal is to explain why merchants
employed a system of collective, instead of individual, punishment for dishonest agents. None of
these papers, however, analyzes the dynamic process in which ﬁrms engaged in international ex-
change build reputations as a response to the imperfect enforceability of contracts.3,4
Interestingly, our results match very closely the qualitative ﬁndings of Johnson et al. (2002).
Using surveys of manufacturing ﬁrms in transition economies, they ﬁnd that the volume of transac-
1McMillan and Woodruﬀ (1999) base their analysis on a survey of managers of Vietnamese private ﬁrms. Ac-
cording to the survey, 91 percent of the managers believe they cannot rely on the courts to enforce contracts.
2In fact, in Anderson’s (2004) survey of the nascent literature on the reactions to the problems created by the
lack of adequate contract enforcement in international transactions, there is no reference to formal analyses of the
role of reputations.
3Ghosh and Ray (1996) and Watson (2002) study agents’ incentives to establish long-term relationships as well.
Ghosh and Ray’s context is one of a community with multiple agents who face informational asymmetries, while
Watson considers a two-player repeated game environment with two-sided informational asymmetries. Institutional
elements such as the level of contract enforcement in a country, however, play no role in either analysis.
4In a diﬀerent context, the literature on sovereign debt also studies the eﬀect of reputational concerns, but on
the incentives of governments to honor international contracts. See Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for a survey of that
literature.
3tions within partnerships grows steadily. This practice of “start small and increase quantities over
time” appears to be very common among ﬁrms entering export markets (see e.g. Egan and Mody
1992). Here, we rationalize it by showing how each exporter increases exports as he becomes con-
vinced that his distributor will not behave opportunistically. This practice has been explained also
by Rauch and Watson (2003), in a setting with asymmetric information, costly search and buyers
who need to make irreversible investments to train foreign suppliers. We show that, if contracts
are not perfectly enforced, ﬁrms may want to "start small" even when those last two elements are
absent.
Johnson et al. (2002) ﬁnd also that, while stricter enforcement of contracts has no clear eﬀect
on long-lasting partnerships, it boosts transactions within new partnerships. This is precisely
what our model predicts: in the former case, reputations are already consolidated, so contract
enforcement is pointless. In the later case, since there remains signiﬁcant uncertainty about the
types of distributors, the short-run impact of stricter contract enforcement within partnerships is
necessarily positive (even though its long-run eﬀect may be negative, as indicated above).
Our model rationalizes also Eichengreen and Irwin’s (1998) ﬁnding that (aggregate) trade ﬂows
display hysteresis, as well as some strong empirical regularities documented by recent research on
exporting behavior at the plant and ﬁrm level (see Tybout 2003 for a survey of that literature).
Two robust ﬁndings in that line of research are that, for most industries, only a relatively small
number of producers in a country export, and that a producer is more likely to export in a certain
period if he exported in the previous period. The standard explanation for these phenomena is
the existence of ﬁrms’ sunk costs to begin exporting, but the precise nature of those costs remains
unclear. Our model indicates that they reﬂect, at least partially, informational asymmetries and
imperfect enforceability of contracts. It suggests, in addition, that the diﬃculties to begin exporting
are market-speciﬁc, consistently with the ﬁndings of Eaton et al. (2004) that ﬁrms typically export
to only a few markets. Our model, therefore, supports the use of measures for the lack of contract
enforceability as proxies for the sunk costs necessary to begin exporting to individual countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes the behavior
of exporters. Section 4 analyzes the behavior of distributors and characterizes an equilibrium of
the model. Section 5 describes the dynamics of trade, while Section 6 introduces search frictions.
Implications for trade policy are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
Our main goal is to study situations where the lack of contract enforcement depresses international
trade. Such situations arise when exporters have to do business with agents in the importing
4country but cannot rely on the legal system to prevent opportunistic behavior by those agents. We
develop an environment with these characteristics. It is based on three main elements, which we
brieﬂy discuss in turn.
i. Contacting distributors
Contacting distributors in the importing country appears to be a critical decision in the process
of exporting. According to the Home Based Business Opportunities, for example, "The most im-
portant step in setting up your business is ﬁnding the contacts ... for commercial distribution."
Similarly, the U.S. Department of Commerce (2000, p. 23) argues that once a "company is orga-
nized to handle exporting, a proper channel of distribution needs to be carefully chosen for each
market," while warning potential exporters that they "should investigate potential representatives
or distributors carefully before entering into an agreement." We want to study precisely these types
of situations, where exporters have to establish channels of distribution in the importing country,
and have to do so cautiously, because distributors can behave opportunistically and will indeed do
so if they have a relatively short horizon and are not inhibited by the legal system.
ii. Credit-based relationships
We consider that exporters and distributors base their relationships on credit. In particular, we
assume that in each period an exporter consigns goods to a distributor, who has the opportunity
to abscond with the full proceeds from the sales of the goods.
Commercial transactions are indeed largely based on credit.5 This approach is also particularly
useful to study situations where export activities are subject to opportunistic behavior. We assume
that, while exporters need distributors in the importing country to operate in that market, an
imperfectly functioning legal system creates uncertainty about whether the distributors will respect
their formal agreements. Now, while there are many dimensions in which exporters may have to
rely on agents in the importing country without full legal protection, allowing distributors to “run
away” with the proceeds from their sales is arguably the simplest way to capture the possibility of
opportunistic/dishonest behavior by those agents. Similarly, while enforcement of contracts matters
in several dimensions of a business relationship, making sure bills are paid is perhaps the clearest
among these situations.
5Interestingly, transactions are often based on credit even in environments where there is virtually no legal protec-
tion, as McMillan and Woodruﬀ’s (1999) analysis of the business conditions in Vietnam clearly exempliﬁes: despite
widespread skepticism about the eﬀectiveness of the judicial system, over 50 percent of the business relationships in
Vietnam involve trade credit.
5iii. Measure of institutional quality
Naturally, the more lenient a country’s legal system is in enforcing international contracts, the
more easily distributors can evade contractually speciﬁed payments to exporters. There are diﬀerent
ways in which we can capture institutional quality in this context. Ranjan and Lee (2003) and
Anderson and Young (2003), for example, use a parameter to represent the proportion of contracts
that the legal system enforces. In the same spirit, we measure the quality of a legal system by
the opportunities for corruption that it prevents. Speciﬁcally, our measure of institutional quality
corresponds to the measure λ ∈ (0,1) of non-corrupt legal agents in the importing country.
We now describe our environment in more detail.
2.1 Environment
Consider an economy with two countries, Home and Foreign. In Home there is a [0,1] continuum
of inﬁnitely lived producers and a [0,1] continuum of diﬀerentiated goods. Only one producer can
manufacture each good, and marginal costs of production are constant at c. Producers can sell
goods in their own market directly, but have no direct access to Foreign’s market. To become
exporters, they need to form a partnership with a distributor from Foreign. Producers discount
the future at a rate δe, where δe ∈ (0,1).
In Foreign, there is a [0,1] continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents with the ability to internally
distribute imported goods. Distributors in Foreign can be either patient or myopic; the measure
of myopic distributors is θ0. A patient distributor (p) is forward-looking with a discount factor
δd ∈ (0,1), while a myopic distributor (m) only maximizes current proﬁts. The type of a distributor
is his private information.
A producer always serves the local market. He can become also an exporter by searching for a
distributor in Foreign. Meetings between producers and distributors are pairwise and happen once
each period. When searching for a distributor, a producer faces an informational friction, since he
does not observe the type of a distributor. To focus on the role played by information frictions, we
initially assume that a producer from Home ﬁnds an agent in Foreign with the ability to distribute
his good with certainty. In Section 6 we relax this assumption and consider the case where there
are also search frictions.
Consider an ongoing partnership between an exporter and a distributor. In every period, the
exporter decides whether to maintain the partnership. If the exporter wants to keep the partner-
ship, he proposes a contract to the distributor. Now, since distributors have incentives to build
reputations only if contracts do not induce a separation between a myopic and a patient distributor,
in what follows we restrict the class of contracts so that such separation is not possible during the
6contracting stage. More speciﬁcally, we assume that the exporter proposes a one-period contract6
to the distributor specifying the quantity to be exported, an exogenous distribution of the revenue
(the exporter and the distributor receive strictly positive fractions α and 1 − α of the revenue, re-
spectively), and no side payments. If the contract is accepted, the exporter produces the quantity
speciﬁed in the contract, bears the production costs and pays a ﬁxed cost κ > 0.7 Otherwise, both
the exporter and the distributor earn zero proﬁts.
In reality, exporters probably screen the reliability of foreign distributors both with contracts
and with experience. We do not allow the former because we want to focus on the mechanics of
the latter. Thus, the purpose of contracts here is only to deﬁne export volumes.
Note, however, that these restrictions on possible contracts are driven mainly by our assumption
that some distributors have strictly no concern about the future. With a more sophisticated
description of these distributors, we could allow for a broader range of contracts and still capture
the dynamic incentives to build reputations.8 We choose to model some distributors as myopic–
and then restrict contracts to a simple form–because this formulation uncovers the main ideas
about reputation in a simpler and more direct way.
Now consider the problem of a distributor on whether to perform according to the contract
speciﬁcations or to default on the contract. First, note that a myopic distributor would like to
default whenever he has the opportunity to do so. In what follows, we want to emphasize that this
opportunity is closely linked with the institutional quality of the foreign country. We formalize this
idea as follows. We assume that before making the decision on whether to default, the distributor
can randomly search for a legal agent in Foreign. Legal agents are either corrupt or honest, with
the measure of honest agents being denoted by λ ∈ [0,1]. A distributor gets away with a default
only when he meets with a corrupt legal agent. Clearly, this assumption implies that a myopic
distributor will have a strict incentive to default whenever he meets a corrupt agent but no incentive
to default upon meeting an honest agent. We assume also that exporters do not observe the possible
6Such short-term contracts conform well to actual businesses practices. As Egan and Mody (1992, p. 326) report,
“Relationships tend to grow incrementally, with their duration and depth more evident ex post than ex ante. A
relationship often begins with a short-term agreement–perhaps a one-year production contract–and continues with
annual renewals ... Thus, a close, long-term relationship may arise with no more formal structure than a continuing
series of renewed short-term contracts.” Similarly, the U.S. Department of Commerce (2000, p. 28) points out
that “some U.S. companies prefer to begin with a relatively short trial period and then extend the contract if the
relationship proves satisfactory to both parties.”
7This ﬁxed cost captures in a simple way the exporter’s opportunity cost to engage in business in Foreign.
8One possibility is to have some distributors being, instead of myopic, of a behavioral type, in the sense that they
always mimic the choice of the patient distributor during the contractual negotiation but may default afterwards. In
that case, no constraints on the form of contracts would be required, since contracts could not reveal any information
about the distributor’s type, which is the condition necessary for reputation to have value in equilibrium.
7interactions between distributors and legal agents in Foreign.
3 Exporter’s Behavior
We analyze the behavior of exporters by considering a generic partnership between an exporter and
a distributor. Throughout this section, we assume that a patient distributor never wants to default
and a myopic distributor defaults whenever he ﬁnds a corrupt legal agent. In the next section, we
prove that this behavior is part of an equilibrium as long as δd is high enough.
The problem of the exporter is as follows. In every period, he decides whether to maintain the
partnership. If he chooses to do so, he writes a one-period contract with the distributor establishing
the volume of output to sell in Foreign. We consider ﬁrst how this quantity is determined.
3.1 Contract
Consider a contract signed at date t and let the exporter’s belief that the distributor is myopic be
denoted by θ. The exporter pays the cost of production and receives a fraction α of the revenue
if the distributor does not default. There is a probability 1 − θ that the distributor is patient, in
which case we claim that he never defaults. However, if he is myopic, he defaults whenever he does
not expect the legal system to enforce his contract, an event with probability 1 − λ. Under the
proposed strategy for the distributors, the exporter’s expected proﬁt when the contract establishes
a production level of q is then
π(q,θ;λ,α,c,κ) = −cq + α[θλ + 1 − θ]R(q) − κ, (1)
where R(q) is the revenue from selling q units in Foreign.9
Note that our assumptions on the structure of the contract imply that it cannot be used to
extract information about the distributor’s type. Hence, when proposing a contract, the exporter
chooses q to maximize π(q,θ;λ,α,c,κ). The ﬁrst-order necessary condition associated with this
problem is
−c + α[θλ + 1 −θ]R￿(Q) = 0, (2)
where Q denotes the exporter’s optimal quantity. It depends on the belief θ of the exporter,
the institutional parameter λ, the exogenous sharing rule, and the marginal cost of production:
Q = Q(θ;λ,α,c). Note that condition (2) requires R￿(Q) > 0, whereas the second-order necessary
condition for Q requires R￿￿(Q) < 0.
9Since marginal costs are constant, domestic sales do not aﬀect foreign sales, and vice versa. Notice also that we
keep ﬁnal consumers on the background, dealing directly with revenue functions.





[θλ + 1 − θ]R￿￿(Q)
< 0. (3)
Thus, the optimal export quantity expands as the belief that the distributor is myopic decreases.
It follows from (2) also that, for a given θ, the current volume of trade expands when legal stability
improves (∂Q/∂λ > 0).10
We assume that parameters λ,α and κ satisfy the following conditions:
A1 : Q(1;λ,α,c) > 0
A2 : π(Q,1;λ,α,c,κ) < 0
A3 : π(Q,0;λ,α,c,κ) > 0.
Thus, the quantity that maximizes current variable expected proﬁts is strictly positive even when
the exporter is certain that the distributor is myopic (θ = 1). In that case, however, the exporter’s
current (total) expected proﬁt is strictly negative. In contrast, when the exporter is certain that
the distributor is patient (θ = 0), his current (total) expected proﬁt is strictly positive.
Given assumptions A1-A3, it is clear that when θ = 1, the exporter terminates the partnership
and produces only for the domestic market. Note, however, that the same reasoning does not
necessarily hold for values of θ close to 1. In that case, even though proﬁts are still negative (since
π is a continuous function of q and θ), it may be optimal to produce because this will generate
additional information about the type of the distributor.
3.2 Information
In every period, the exporter has to decide whether to maintain the partnership with the distributor
he is paired with. This decision depends critically on the exporter’s belief about the type of the
distributor. For example, if he believes that there is a high probability that the distributor will
attempt to default on the contract, he will likely prefer to terminate the partnership.
The exporter updates his belief with respect to the type of the distributor through his experience
in the partnership. This experience reﬂects all previous decisions made by the distributor. Under
the proposed strategy for the distributors, if the exporter observes a default, he forms a posterior
equal to 1, since he immediately concludes that the distributor is myopic. Alternatively, if he does
10Note in addition that, if enforcement of contracts is stricter when the involved parties are within the same
national jurisdiction, as it appears to be the rule, then exporters will tend to sell more domestically than in foreign
markets, in line with the ﬁndings in the empirical literature on plant-level exporting behavior (see Tybout 2003).
9not observe a default, he adjusts his belief about the distributor’s type according to the Bayes rule:
θ({no default},θ) ≡ Pr(m | {no default} ∩ θ) =
λθ
λθ + 1 − θ
< θ. (4)
Note that the adjustment in θ is downwards in this case. That is, when the exporter does not
observe a default, he increases his belief that the distributor is patient.
More generally, let 0 indicate a record of no default and 1 indicate a record of default in a given
experience and deﬁne θt(C) as the belief that the distributor is myopic given an experience ht with
size t and cardinality C, where C ≡
￿t
j=1hj, hj ∈ {0,1}. Under the assumed strategy for the




λtθ0+1−θ0 if C = 0
1 if C ￿= 0.
(5)
Note that θt(0) decreases with t and converges to zero when t goes to inﬁnity. That is, if a
distributor never defaults, in the long run the exporter becomes convinced that the distributor is
patient. We interpret θ as the reputation of the distributor. A reputation of being patient means
that the belief θ of the exporter regarding the distributor in their partnership is small.
We now take as given the function Q and the updating process described in equation (5) and
look at the exporter’s decision between maintaining a partnership and terminating it.
3.3 Partnership
Consider an exporter at date t facing the decision on whether to maintain a partnership. Since
the only new information he accumulates over time comes from his experience with the distributor,
each possible experience up to date t represents an information set upon which he can base his
decision. Moreover, we know from expression (5) that all relevant information in an experience can
be captured by the belief θ associated with it. Given θ, the exporter computes both the optimal
quantity to export and, given the assumed strategy for the distributors, the distribution of the next
period’s beliefs. These two elements aﬀect, respectively, the ﬂow and the continuation payoﬀ of
maintaining a partnership. The ﬂow payoﬀ corresponds to the current proﬁt π(θ), where
π(θ) ≡ −cQ + α[θλ + 1 − θ]R(Q) − κ. (6)
To ﬁnd the continuation payoﬀ of maintaining a partnership, recall that after observing a default,
the exporter immediately concludes that the distributor is myopic and updates his posterior to
θ = 1. Assumption A2 then implies that the exporter terminates the partnership. Alternatively, if
the exporter does not observe a default, he increases his belief that the distributor is patient. Since
10the exporter’s proﬁt is a decreasing function of θ, the exporter does not terminate the partnership
in this case.
This reasoning implies that the exporter’s expected proﬁt can be described in terms of a value
function v(θ) as this:11
v(θ) = max{0,π(θ) + δe Pr(0 | θ)v[θ(0,θ)]}, (7)
where
Pr(0 | θ) = 1 − θ + λθ (8)
is the probability of no default given the belief θ. Expression (7) can be interpreted as follows.
At every date, if the exporter decides to maintain the partnership, he receives expected proﬁts of
π(θ) and, through his experience, obtains additional information about the distributor’s type. Note
that this reasoning presumes that an exporter will never attempt to form a new partnership after
terminating one. This is a direct consequence of the fact that, after date 0, only myopic distributors
are available to form new partnerships.12
Lemma 1 describes the exporter’s optimal decision as a function of his belief θ.
Lemma 1 Assume that a patient distributor never wants to default and a myopic distributor de-
faults whenever he ﬁnds a corrupt legal agent. Then, the problem of the exporter has an unique
optimal solution. He starts the partnership at date 0 as long as his prior is smaller than θ, where
θ ∈ (0,1). If the exporter observes a default, he terminates the partnership and produces only for
the local market from that period on. If the exporter does not observe a default, he maintains the
partnership. At any period when the partnership is active, he exports Q(θ;λ,α,c).
Proof. First, since Q(θ;λ,α,c) maximizes π(q,θ;λ,α,c,κ), it must be the quantity established in
any contract. Assumption A2 and the Bayesian updating in (5) imply that the exporter terminates
the partnership after the realization of a default. Moreover, since all available distributors from
date 1 on are myopic, an exporter never attempts to form a new partnership after date 0.
Now, to show the existence of the threshold θ, consider the exporter’s decision to start a
partnership at date 0. If he enters the partnership, his expected payoﬀ is
￿ v(θ0) = π(θ0) + δe Pr(0 | θ0)v(θ1(0)), (9)
11We do not include domestic proﬁts in v(θ), since they do not aﬀect (and are not aﬀected by) the decision on
whether to keep the foreign partnership.
12In Section 6, when we introduce search frictions, the pool of available agents after date 0 includes patient
distributors as well.
11where v(θ1(0)) is given by (7) evaluated at θ = θ1(0). Substituting for v(θ1(0)) in (9), we obtain
￿ v(θ0) = π(θ0) + δe Pr(0 | θ0)[π(θ1(0)) +δe Pr(0 | θ1(0))v(θ2(0))].
Repeating the same substitution and using (8), we can rewrite equation (9) after some manipulation
as







(1 − θj(0) + λθj(0)).










(1 − θ0 + λiθ0)2 < 0.
Moreover, each component of
i−1 ￿
j=0
(1−θj(0)+λθj(0)) is also a strictly decreasing function of θ0. We










by A2, there is a unique value θ such that
￿
￿ v(θ) ≤ 0 if θ0 ≥ θ
￿ v(θ) > 0 if θ0 < θ.
Hence, an exporter enters in a partnership if and only if his prior θ0 is below the threshold θ.
Throughout the paper, we assume θ0 < θ. Hence, at date 0 all producers want to form part-
nerships and become exporters. Note that the exporter’s problem is potentially rather complex.
Exporters need to make a decision after every experience they face, and the set of possible ex-
periences tends to increase as time goes on. The key element in our model that avoids these
complications is our assumption that “bad outcomes” from the perspective of exporters are always
caused by opportunistic behavior of distributors. This implies that the construction of a good
reputation takes time, whereas a bad reputation can be acquired in a single period. The central
advantage of this simpliﬁcation is that it allows us to generate precise, clear-cut results on the re-
lationship between the history of a partnership and its corresponding volume of trade. We discuss
this issue further in Section 5.13
13In Araujo and Ornelas (2004), we consider the case where exporters may face bad outcomes even when distrib-
124 Distributor’s Behavior and Equilibrium
We now solve the distributor’s problem and characterize an equilibrium of the partnership between
the exporter and the distributor. Note that, since the exporter pays the cost of production, the
gain of the distributor inside a partnership is always positive. Therefore, a contract never violates
the distributor’s participation constraint.
Consider then the problem faced by a myopic distributor. By deﬁnition, he does not care about
the future and thus does not bother to build reputations. As a result, he has an incentive to default
and keep the whole revenue whenever he meets a corrupt legal agent. When a myopic distributor
meets an honest agent, he is indiﬀerent between defaulting and not. We break this indiﬀerence by
assuming that he does not default in that case.14
A patient distributor, on the other hand, anticipates that after a default his partnership will
be terminated. Hence, as long as he is not too impatient, he does not default. In particular, if the
discount factor of a myopic distributor is at least as large as the exporter’s share of the revenue,
the distributor does not default. Lemma 2 formalizes this claim.
Lemma 2 Assume that exporters behave as described in Lemma 1. Then, there is a value δd
∈ (0,α] such that, for all δd > δd, the optimal choice of a patient distributor is to always honor his
contract.
Proof. Consider the problem of a patient distributor at some date t. He does not deviate from
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[1 − θt(0)(1 − λ)]R￿￿[Q(θt(0);λ,α,c)]
< 0
utors do not behave opportunistically, for example because of a negative demand shock not observed by foreigners.
In that case, both good and bad reputations require time to be established. It turns out that the optimal behavior
of an exporter also involves a threshold θ
￿ such that a partnership is terminated if and only if the posterior θ of the
exporter becomes higher than θ
￿. The solution method is, however, more demanding and involves the interpretation
of the exporter’s problem as a Two-Armed Bandit Problem.
14He would strictly prefer to not default in that case if, for example, he had to pay a fee when he loses in court.













for all θt(0), or
δd > α.
Since this condition is only suﬃcient but not necessary, then there exists a δd ∈ (0,α] such that,
for all δd > δd, the optimal choice of a patient distributor is to always honor his contract.
We now show that the exporter’s behavior described in Lemma 1 and the distributor’s behavior
described in Lemma 2 are part of an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The exporter always starts a partnership at date 0, chooses quantities according
to the function Q(θ;λ,α,c), and maintains the partnership as long as he observes no default. A
myopic distributor defaults if and only if he ﬁnds a corrupt legal agent. A patient distributor never
defaults. Irrespective of his type, the distributor never terminates the partnership. This strategy
proﬁle, together with the Bayesian updating described in equation (5), is a sequential equilibrium.
Proof. If the partnership is terminated, the probability that the distributor will meet another
exporter in the future is zero, since the exporters anticipate that the distributors available after
t = 0 are all myopic. Therefore, the distributor never wants to separate from the exporter. From
Lemma 2, we know that a patient distributor chooses to honor contracts as long as δd > α. In
contrast, myopic distributors default whenever they ﬁnd a corrupt legal agent, since they just
maximize current proﬁt. Note now that, by construction, the exporter’s strategy is a best reply
to the distributor’s strategy. Moreover, it is sequentially rational by the principle of optimality.
Finally, since beliefs are deﬁned by the Bayes’ rule after every possible experience, including the
ones that are never reached in equilibrium, they are consistent.
5 Dynamics of Trade
We can now describe how the volume of trade within a partnership evolves under the equilibrium
described in Proposition 1. Note ﬁrst that, even though the type of a distributor is crucial to
14determine the probability that a partnership lasts, the actual volume of trade depends only on the
distributor’s reputation. This is so because there is only one experience that arises with positive
probability within an ongoing partnership, i.e., a sequence of no defaults. This feature of the
model allows us to concentrate on the evolution of the export volume irrespective of the type of
the distributor the exporter is paired with.
Note also that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the distributor’s reputation and
the time span of the partnership. Therefore, we can obtain a clear relationship between the export
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Hence, in every ongoing partnership, the volume of trade increases over time and converges to
Q(0;λ,α,c), the level reached when contracts are perfectly enforced. This result captures in a clear
way the idea that trust is built over time, through repeated interactions. While an exporter is
learning about the type of his partner, he exports less than he would under perfectly enforceable
contracts. Thus, in the ﬁrst stages of a partnership, relatively low quantities are exported; if the
distributor appears to be reliable, the exporter then progressively improves the volume exported.
This result rationalizes the practice of "start small and increase quantities over time" referred to
in the Introduction. If this process continues until the exporter becomes suﬃciently convinced
that his distributor is patient, the lack of contract enforcement becomes eﬀectively inconsequential.
Hence, in line with with the empirical ﬁndings of Johnson et al. (2002), suﬃciently long-lasting
partnerships overcome all problems created by informational frictions.
At any time, the volume of trade within an ongoing partnership is aﬀected also by the institu-
tional setting of the Foreign economy. We study this issue by describing how changes in λ aﬀect
current and future contracts between the exporter and the distributor. Suppose that, at the begin-
ning of date t, there is an institutional development in Foreign that reduces the number of corrupt
legal agents–e.g., an increase in the costs of being caught. This change will then increase the
proportion of international contracts enforced in Foreign. Let the resulting institutional parameter
be denoted by λ, where the subscript t on λ indicates that the change takes place at date t. Clearly,
the immediate eﬀect of this change is an improvement in the volume of trade, just as Johnson et





[1 − θt(1 − λ)]R￿￿(Qt)
> 0.
Since the exporter anticipates that he will receive his share of the total revenue with a higher
probability, he is willing to export more.
Note that the distributor’s reputation at t is not aﬀected by the increase in λ at that date. This
is so because reputation is a function of past levels of contract enforcement, not the current one.
On the other hand, the change in λ aﬀects the future reputation of the distributor. Consider, for





(λkθt + 1 − θt)2 > 0.
Hence, a further implication of the improvement in the institutional setting of Foreign is that it
reduces the future reputation of distributors, relative to what they would have been under the lower
λ. Intuitively, a higher λ makes it less clear for an exporter that the distributor is complying with
the contract voluntarily, rather than motivated by the threat of a legal challenge.
As a result, the net impact of an institutional change in Foreign on future export volumes is
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There are two eﬀects in play here. First, an increase in λ at date t has a direct positive eﬀect
on exports in period t + k for the same reason it has in date t. This eﬀect is represented by the
ﬁrst element in the square bracket of equation (11). But there is also an indirect negative eﬀect
due to the slower improvement in the distributor’s reputation associated with the increase in λ,
represented by the second element in the square bracket of equation (11). The net impact depends
on the comparison between these two forces. That is, an increase in λ at date t improves the export
volume at date t + k beyond its original trend if and only if











where η(θt+k,λ) indicates the date t + k elasticity of the distributor’s reputation with respect to
a date t change in the institutional setup in Foreign. The intuition is clear: the overall eﬀect of
16an increase in λ on future export volumes is positive as long as it does not induce large changes
in the process of reputation building. That is, it is positive as long as the time t + k reputation is
inelastic with respect to changes in λ at time t. Inequality (12) can be written also as follows.
Proposition 2 An increase in λ at date t improves the export volume at date t + k beyond its
original trend if and only if
t + k <
λ
1 − λ
1 − θ0(1 − λ2t+k)
1 −θ0
. (13)
Proof. From (5), we have that θt+k corresponds (when C = 0) to
θt+k =
λt+kθt
λt+kθt + 1 − θt
.
Using this expression and calculating ∂θt+k/∂λ, we can rewrite inequality (12) as
t + k <
λ
1 −λ
1 − θt(1 − λt+k)
1 − θt
.
Using (5) again and manipulating, we obtain (13).
The two sides of inequality (13) are displayed in Figure 1. The condition implies that there is
a value of λ for any t + k, say λ(t + k), such that a small increase in λ at date t expands trade
at date t + k for all λ > λ(t + k) but decreases it otherwise. In other words, there are "increasing
returns to institutional quality" in terms of trade. The intuition is that, in economies with a weak
enforcement structure, the exporter’s belief about the distributor’s type is very sensitive to changes
in λ. In that case, a small tightening in the enforcement of contracts hurts the distributor’s ability
to increase his reputation signiﬁcantly and, as a consequence, lowers the quantity exported in future
periods. In contrast, in economies with stronger enforcement structures, the role of reputations is
limited anyway, so when λ increases, its direct eﬀect on trade prevails.
The impact of an institutional improvement on trade within an existing partnership is therefore
subtle. The immediate eﬀect is always positive, but a positive future impact relies on the economy
having already a minimum level of enforcement structure.
Now recall that partnerships with patient distributors last forever, while partnerships with
myopic distributors survive only if international contracts are enforced continuously in Foreign.
More speciﬁcally, a partnership with a myopic distributor formed at date 0 will be in place at
date t with probability ρm
t = λt for all t. An increase in λ, therefore, has also a positive eﬀect
on the aggregate level of trade, as it slows down the process by which partnerships with myopic
distributors are terminated.
17Figure 1: Right- and left- hand sides of inequality (13)
Nevertheless, in the long run the trade volume in the economy is the same that would be realized
if types were perfectly known, since Qt converges to Q(0;λ,α,c) and ρm
t converges to zero as t goes
to inﬁnity. We show in the next section, however, that when the economy displays search frictions,
informational frictions have a long-lasting impact on the economy.
6 Search Frictions
In this section, we add search frictions to our basic model in a way similar to Rauch and Trindade
(2003). Rauch and Trindade consider an international economy where producers from Home ran-
domly search for producers in Foreign to form a partnership. Producers in both countries are
distributed across a continuum of diﬀerent types, and the eﬃciency of a partnership depends on
the distance between the types. Here, we adopt a simpliﬁed version of that structure by assuming
that, in each attempt to ﬁnd a distributor in Foreign, the producer meets with one capable of
distributing his good with probability x ∈ (0,1). On the other hand, we diﬀer from Rauch and
Trindade also by allowing producers to search for foreign distributors in every period, instead of
only once.
The presence of search frictions alters the dynamics of international trade signiﬁcantly. First,
since some producers always return home without a partner, the volume of trade at the aggregate
level falls. Furthermore, this eﬀect persists in the long run, since a positive measure of patient dis-
tributors never becomes involved in partnerships with exporters. This outcome arises even though
the search process is costless and the probability that a patient distributor would be eventually
within an active partnership, were the search process to continue indeﬁnitely, would converge to one.
18Thus, while in the long run an economy with only informational frictions replicates a frictionless
economy, search frictions introduce a long-lasting impact.
To formalize these claims, let θt(x) denote the producers’ belief about the fraction of available
myopic distributors at date t when the degree of search frictions is x. Proposition 3 then follows.
Proposition 3 For all x ∈ (0,1) and t, θt(x) > θt−1(x). Moreover, there exists a t￿ such that, for
all t ≥ t￿ and x ∈ (0,1), θt(x) ≥ θ. Hence, after date t￿, producers without a partnership serve only
the local market.
Proof. Let m1 (p1) be the measure of myopic (patient) distributors available for matches at date
1. m1 is equal to m0 times the probability that a distributor does not ﬁnd an appropriate exporter,
1−x, plus m0 times the probability that this myopic distributor has entered in a partnership with
an exporter but defaults on the contract in period 0, x(1 − λ). That is,
m1 = m0(1 − x) + m0x(1 − λ).
On the other hand, since patient distributors never default on the contract,
p1 = p0(1 −x).
Proceeding in a similar way, we can obtain the values of mt and pt after some computation:





pt = pt−1(1 − x).





Note that θt+1(x) > θt(x) as long as mt > mt−1(1 − x), which is true for all x ∈ (0,1). Moreover,
since




mt−1(1 − xλ) + pt−1(1 − x)
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θ0(1 − xλ)t







θ0(1 − xλ)t + (1 − θ0)(1 −x)t = 1,
we can conclude that, for all x ∈ (0,1), there exists t￿ such that, for all t ≥ t￿, θt(x) ≥ θ.
The intuition for this result is as follows. In every date, the pool of available distributors–i.e.,
those without a match–comes from two distinct sources. First, in every date t > 0, there is a
probability 1 − x that the producers who searched for partners at t − 1 did not ﬁnd appropriate
distributors, in which case the latter remained available at t. Second, there are myopic distributors
within partnerships at t−1 that failed to honor their contracts and caused the breakdown of their
relationships. Thus, myopic distributors become available for new matches at a higher rate than
patient ones do. As a result, the ex ante probability that an available distributor is myopic increases
over time. Producers anticipate this process and adjust their priors accordingly. Eventually, their
prior reaches θ, the threshold on beliefs deﬁned in Lemma 1. At that point, non-exporting producers
stop searching for distributors and remain producing only for the local market from then on. Since
θ < 1, there will still be a positive measure of patient distributors who had not found adequate
partners. Hence, the trade potential of the market is not fully realized even in the long run.
Note that an important feature underlying the result in Proposition 3 is the exporter’s inability
to observe the previous history of a distributor. In particular, upon meeting with a distributor
at some date t > 0, the exporter does not know whether the distributor comes from a broken
relationship or has simply never met with an appropriate exporter. Distributors from the ﬁrst
group are myopic with certainty; those from the second group are myopic with probability θ0 < θ.
In this context, a mechanism through which producers could learn the distributors’ histories
could prevent the adverse selection problem described in Proposition 3, and the search frictions
would have no long-run eﬀect on the level of international trade. The dissemination of such infor-
mation could occur, for example, with the formation of business networks among producers.15 Our
framework provides a natural benchmark one can build on to study the role of such institutions.
Consider, for example, the scenario where each producer discloses the identity of the distributors
who had defaulted on a contract with him and this information becomes available to all other pro-
ducers. Since this mechanism would allow producers to separate distributors with a history of no
defaults from those with a previous default, an exporter’s prior upon meeting a distributor from the
latter group would be 1, while the prior upon meeting a distributor from the former group would
be instead θ0. Under these conditions, producers would never stop searching for an appropriate
15Rauch (2001) provides an insightful survey of that literature, including the broad empirical support for the eﬀects
of networks. As he points out, dissemination of information is one of the main roles of networks in international trade.
20partner in Foreign. As a consequence, all patient distributors would eventually form a partnership,
since the measure of patient types without a match, (1 − x)t, goes to zero when t goes to inﬁnity.
7 Trade Policy
We now look at the impact of trade policy on the dynamics of trade. First, we look at the intensive
margin eﬀects, i.e., the impact of a tariﬀ change on the volume of trade within a partnership. We
then consider the extensive margin eﬀects of such a policy.
7.1 Intensive margin
When a producer from Home has to incur in an ad valorem tariﬀ τ to export to Foreign, his choice
of how much to export is altered. In that case, the exporter’s expected proﬁt becomes
π(q,θ;λ,α,c,κ,τ) = −cq + α[θλ + 1 − θ](1 − τ)R(q) − κ.
Denote the exporter’s optimal choice in this case by ￿ Q = ￿ Q(θ;λ,α,c,τ). Trade is lower with the
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where ￿(￿ Q) ≡ −
￿ QR￿￿(￿ Q)
R￿(￿ Q) is the (negative of the) elasticity of the marginal revenue evaluated at
q = ￿ Q. For concreteness, suppose the following condition holds:






This condition, which is equivalent to assuming that
￿ Q
￿( ￿ Q) is a decreasing function, holds if R￿￿￿(￿ Q)
is not ‘too large’ (i.e., if R￿(￿ Q) is not ‘too convex’). It is satisﬁed, for example, by linear demands.
The condition implies that the eﬀect of a tariﬀ reduction on imports is greater, the smaller the
initial import level, ￿ Q.
Now, recall that ￿ Q depends on the institutional parameter and on the exporters’ beliefs about
distributors. For example, trade volumes are, at any period, decreasing functions of the measure of
21myopic distributors (θ0). Hence, it follows that under A5, the eﬀectiveness of trade liberalization
is greater in societies where more agents are believed to be myopic. Although this is beyond the
scope of our model, it could be argued that this is more likely to be the case in countries where
the economic environment is less predictable and the rule of law is weak. It is precisely in those
societies that trade liberalization would tend to have the greatest impact on trade.
For given θ0 and λ, trade within a partnership is a decreasing function also of θt, which in turn
falls monotonically over time. It follows that lower tariﬀs are more eﬀective in raising trade in
ﬂedgling partnerships than in mature ones. Thus, history matters not only for trade volumes, as
Eichengreen and Irwin (1998) argue, but also for the eﬃcacy of trade liberalization.
Now, since the eﬀect of λ on ￿ Q depends on the horizon of the analysis, so will the impact
of better enforcement of contracts on the eﬀectiveness of trade liberalization programs. Under
A5, weaker enforcement of contracts ampliﬁes the response of trade volumes to tariﬀ reductions,
for given beliefs. But institutions also shape the dynamic responses of trade volumes to tariﬀ
reductions, through their inﬂuence on the process of reputation building. In the short run, then,
the eﬃcacy of trade liberalization is reduced by an increase in λ. On the other hand, if the initial
level of contract enforceability is too low, the analysis of Section 5 suggests that an increase in λ
can induce more future trade. In that case, better enforcement of contracts could also increase the
long-run eﬃcacy of lower trade barriers in promoting trade.
In any case, the important message here is that the eﬀectiveness of trade liberalization will
in general hinge on the quality of the country’s institutions. Without taking that into account,
one could either underestimate or overestimate systematically the eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions on a
country’s imports. Similarly, inter-country comparisons of the eﬀects of trade liberalization would
produce inaccurate results if institutional quality were not controlled for.
7.2 Extensive margin
We now look at the impact of a tariﬀ change on the number of ongoing partnerships, i.e., its
extensive margin eﬀects. First, we establish the relationship between the tariﬀ τ and θ. Clearly,
since ￿ Q is a decreasing function of τ, the same is true for the expected proﬁt. Speciﬁcally, (and
denoting expected proﬁt by π(θ,τ) to shorten the notation) we obtain:
∂π(θ,τ)
∂τ
= −α[θλ + 1 − θ]R(￿ Q) < 0.
We can then compute the exporter’s value function as











= −α[θ0λ + 1 − θ0]R(￿ Q0) −
∞ ￿
i=1
α[θiλ + 1 −θi]R(￿ Qi)
i−1 ￿
j=0
(1 − θj + λθj) < 0.
That is, a decrease in the tariﬀ raises the value of entering into a partnership. By applying the same
reasoning used in the proof of Lemma 1, we can then conclude that there exists a θ(τ) such that
an exporter enters into a partnership if and only if his prior is below θ(τ). Moreover, a decrease in
the tariﬀ increases θ(τ).
The existence of a negative relationship between the tariﬀ level and the exporters’ willingness
to enter into a partnership implies that, in an economy where the impact of informational frictions
is aggravated by the presence of search frictions, a decrease in the tariﬀ would increase the number
of partnerships in the long run. The proposition below proves this result.
Proposition 4 In an economy with search frictions, there exists a inverse relationship between the
measure of partnerships in the long run and the level of the tariﬀ.
Proof. First, note that the dynamics of θt(x) is not aﬀected by the tariﬀ level, since it depends
only on the dynamics of the measure of myopic distributors without a partnership. Hence, the
same result of Proposition 1 holds in an economy with the presence of an ad valorem tariﬀ τ. We
only need to replace θ with θ(τ). Moreover, since a decrease in τ raises θ(τ), the date t￿ at which
θt￿(x) ≥ θ(τ) is also a decreasing function of τ. As a result, after a decrease in τ, exporters without
a partnership will keep searching for a longer time before deciding to quit the foreign market.
Clearly, this implies an increase in the measure of partnerships in the long run.
Thus, trade liberalization not only induces current exporters to export more; it also spurs entry
in the foreign market. Naturally, this eﬀect is stronger, the larger is the reduction in the tariﬀ. The
nature of the tariﬀ change also shapes this eﬀect. If the lower tariﬀ is perceived to be temporary,
it would have a relatively small impact on ￿ v(θ0,τ), and therefore would have only a minor eﬀect
on the extensive margin of trade. In contrast, if the lower tariﬀ is perceived to be permanent, as
we implicitly assumed above, it would have a much more signiﬁcant impact on ￿ v(θ0,τ) and on the
extensive margin of trade. A similar analysis applies for the eﬀectiveness of changes in exchange
rates on trade ﬂows. Overall, this sheds further light on the nature of the sunk costs necessary to
start exporting, clarifying the role of expectations about policy in determining whether a ﬁrm will
begin to export, and the reason why a ﬁrm that begins to export because of a shock (e.g., trade
liberalization or a currency devaluation) may continue to export even when the shock is reversed.
238 Concluding Remarks
The idea that ﬁrms engaged in international trade build reputations to substitute for weak en-
forcement of contracts is intuitive and important empirically, as several recent studies have demon-
strated. This paper is an initial step toward understanding the role of contract enforcement in
international trade and the response of individual traders through the construction of reputations.
We view this as a necessary development in an area where theory has lagged behind both intuition
and empirics.
We carry out the analysis with a model that is very simple yet contains all the key ingredients
to allow us to formalize the idea that inadequate enforcement of contracts matters for international
trade. The model also helps to rationalize several stylized facts at the ﬁrm level. Moreover,
we characterize the dynamics of trade and show that an institutional improvement has both a
positive direct eﬀect and a negative indirect eﬀect, through the process of reputation building,
on trade ﬂows. We show how search frictions transmit and aggravate the problems created by
inadequate enforcement at the micro level to the aggregate level. We indicate that the eﬀectiveness
of trade policy depends on the level of contract enforcement in the country, on the experience
of the producers exporting to the country, and on the share of distributors in the country that
are perceived to be forward-looking. We show, in addition, that trade liberalization mitigates the
negative eﬀects of search costs through its positive eﬀects on the extensive margin of trade.
At the micro level, the main testable prediction of our model is that while a ﬁrm is exporting to
a country, its exports should increase overtime if the level of contract enforcement in the country is
weak, particularly in the ﬁrst periods of export activity to that market. Such a prediction could be
distinguished empirically from, for example, the one from the recent empirical literature on ﬁrms’
export behavior. That literature is able to rationalize the fact that only very few ﬁrms export by
relying on the existence of sunk costs to begin exporting, just as our model does by relying on
incomplete information and imperfect enforcement. However, that line of research does not suggest
any systematic trend in the level of exports of a ﬁrm after it breaks into a new market, in contrast
to our model. With the exception of Eaton et al. (2004), it does not imply either that the costs
to begin exporting should be market-speciﬁc. Our model suggests that they are, and provides a
guideline to measure those costs–the level of contract enforcement in the country.
It is also worth pointing out that our structure is quite ﬂexible, and as such it can be extended
in several directions, which could provide further testable predictions and enhance the explanatory
power of our model. For example, our model could provide insights into the incentives to form
transnational networks, an issue that has not yet been formally analyzed, as Rauch (2001) points
out. For that kind of analysis, some structure on the costs to form networks would be necessary. For
24instance, there could be a ﬁxed cost per period (say to ﬁnance the distribution of information) that
each producer would have to pay to participate in the network. The gain from participating in such
an organization varies, but is likely to increase over time, since the fraction of available distributors
from broken partnerships increases over time, making it more important for an exporter to be able
to distinguish between those distributors and the ones that have never entered in a partnership. It
is then possible that participation may not be worthwhile initially, but becomes so as the adverse
selection aggravates. The costs to coordinate or to disseminate information to producers may also
be increasing in the size of the group. If so, networks and business groups may restrict membership,
perhaps allowing only members who share some characteristic or have some common background
that facilitates coordination. In such a case, a network might hurt outsiders.
One could also relax our assumption of identical marginal costs of production. Allowing for
heterogeneous costs among producers could generate richer dynamics, because the threshold θ
would become producer-speciﬁc. The reason is that higher marginal costs are associated with lower
current and future proﬁts and, thus, with lower overall gains from forming a partnership. The
direct implication is that only the most eﬃcient producers would export, corroborating a very
robust ﬁnding in the empirical literature on plant-level export behavior. The model would display
also Johnson et al.’s (2002) ﬁnding that a stronger legal system induces the formation of more
partnerships. This would add an extra positive eﬀect of stricter enforcement of contracts on the
volume of international trade, and would also tend to enrich the analysis of trade policy.
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